UA
FR
DEby Anastasia Sheremok
1. Introduction
Since the start of the full-scale invasion, Russia has systematically targeted Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. Over time, the intensity of these attacks has increased: facilities are now confronted with coordinated assaults involving up to 40 missiles and 400 drones, overwhelming existing air defense capacities. Russia has increasingly focused on western Ukraine with the objective of disrupting electricity imports from EU Member States and prioritized attacking substations that enable cross-border electricity flows from the European Union.
These attacks have unfolded during an exceptionally harsh winter 2025-2026, when temperatures have fallen up to –20 degrees Celsius, contributing to a nationwide humanitarian crisis. In this context, three consecutive months of extreme cold require an immediate and coordinated emergency response as well as a forward-looking strategy aimed at preparing for the next winter season.
2. The EU as the main actor
The EU is the largest donor to Ukraine, having provided approximately €3 billion in energy aid since the outbreak of the war. EU support operates along two interrelated axes.
The first axis concerns the provision of equipment needed to repair Ukraine’s energy system. Following intensified attacks on gas production facilities in October 2025, Ukraine faces a deficit of approximately 6.5 bcm in winter 2026. At the same time, Ukraine is likely to become a central pillar of future EU energy security initiatives, as it has significant potential due to its gas storage facilities and substantial green energy opportunities, which could enable it to become a major actor in European energy security in the future. Although around €1 billion under the Ukraine Facility has been allocated for emergency gas purchases, further gas market reforms, including adjustments to public service obligations, are necessary to create effective price signals.
The second axic concerns deeper integration with the EU energy market, allowing Ukraine to import electricity and gas when necessary. The Ukraine Energy Support Fund, managed by the Energy Community, is the main actor in channeling pledges. Synchronization with the European electricity system occurred in March 2022. Since then, regulatory reforms have expanded cross-border trade with the EU and Moldova. Additionally, Ukraine is preparing to adopt an electricity integration package to improve regulatory alignment and facilitate imports. Measures include revised price caps and long-term capacity allocation rules for interconnectors with Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia.
This said, market constraints further complicate response efforts. Demand for energy-related equipment remains extremely high: even basic items such as electric blankets may be unavailable at scale. Prices for generators, batteries, and other essential equipment increase significantly during peak demand periods, and suppliers require extended lead times (p. 2). Delayed funding, therefore, results in higher costs, longer procurement timelines, and reduced coverage.
3. Bridging the remaining gaps
The electricity export capacity from the EU to Ukraine has increased to nearly 3 GW, up from just over 2 GW in the winter of 2025-2026, ensuring maximum possible support through this channel. As attacks intensify, assistance efforts must expand proportionally. This creates a moving target: support increases, but so does destruction, widening the gap between needs and available resources.
Firstly, addressing this gap requires enhanced air defense and stronger protection of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. Requests for air defense remained an important and sensitive issue for a long time. Here we observe a trade-off between speed of delivery and the objective of strengthening Europe’s own defense capacity: the EU aims to reinforce its capabilities while supporting Ukraine. However, Ukraine requires certain systems urgently. A compromise may be necessary to ensure faster deliveries to Ukraine while also building sustainable production capacity in Europe in the medium term.
Secondly, passive protection measures are equally important. Energy companies can implement passive protections such as gabions and reinforced concrete shielding. Ukraine has effectively become a ‘laboratory’ for practical energy system protection that could inform European practices, and lessons are being drawn from these developments. The International Energy Agency recently published ten lessons learned from Ukraine on protecting and strengthening energy system resilience. These suggestions should be integrated into European and Ukrainian policies.
Thirdly, the expansion of Russian nuclear power projects abroad is geopolitically significant. Facilities constructed, owned, and operated by Russia already create long-term influence over host countries and affect their energy mix. This is why Russian activity in the nuclear sector remains under close observation and is not excluded from potential future measures. It is important that at some stage, nuclear fuel imports will also be addressed, which would end related business activities in Europe. The nuclear sector is part of the REPowerEU objective of eliminating EU dependence on Russian energy imports.
4.Urgency of applying these lessons
The most significant gaps relate to timing, flexibility, and risk tolerance. There should be no assumption that there is ample time to act. Preparation or the next energy crisis requires funding to be available well in advance, ideally during the summer months and under flexible conditions. Energy resilience cannot be built reactively once winter begins or after infrastructure damage has occurred. However, funding is often disbursed late in the year and under strict budget frameworks. As a result, responses begin only after communities have endured weeks without reliable heating, water, or electricity.
Over four years of war, technologies and countermeasures adapted quickly. In sub-zero temperatures, even short delays can be life-threatening for elderly people, persons with disabilities, and those living in poorly insulated housing. Operations require rapid, high-stakes decisions, and procurement strategies must adapt quickly. While budget reallocations may be needed within days rather than months, many funding instruments are not designed to accommodate this level of operational agility (p. 2).
Therefore, it is necessary to consider what would happen to energy systems in scenarios involving potential hostilities. Although the EU has a framework on the resilience of critical entities and legislation addressing the cybersecurity resilience of energy infrastructure, further reflection is required on how resilience will be ensured in practice.
Conclusion
To summarize, energy resilience is cross-sectoral. Stable energy supply stimulates healthcare delivery, water access, protection outcomes, displacement prevention, and economic stability. To address the crisis effectively, support mechanisms must evolve toward prevention, flexibility, and risk-sharing. Without these adjustments, responses will remain reactive, addressing deterioration after prolonged hardship rather than preventing it.
As for the immediate priorities during Ukraine’s energy crisis, they include enhanced protection: both shielding of facilities and air defense systems, and rapid replacement equipment to restore damaged infrastructure within days rather than months. Although current support granted by the EU is tangible, it must accelerate for Ukraine to win the war.