UA
FR
DEby Anastasia Sheremok
Many older Ukrainians entered Belgium after February 2022 not as independent beneficiaries but as parents joining their adult children in fleeing from war. From that moment onwards, responsibility for their social care was de facto shifted onto the family, rather than borne by the Belgian State.
In practice, the response of Belgian authorities often stops at the issuance of residence Card A, with elderly Ukrainians under temporary protection remaining excluded from integration measures, structured social assistance, and long-term support schemes. In more than 80% of cases, the financial responsibility for supporting elderly parents falls on women, most often Ukrainian daughters living in Belgium. As a result, the adult children, often themselves recent arrivals, become de facto social safety nets. At the same time, Ukrainian women who hosted their parents were excluded from compensation schemes because they were not recognized as “official host families” within frameworks administered by the Red Cross or Fedasil.
Even more controversially, income levels that are currently deemed sufficient to support elderly parents under temporary protection may soon be considered insufficient to secure a residence permit through family reunification. In some EU Member States, this shift could occur almost overnight if the transitional peroid from the Temporary Protection Directivein place.
New income thresholds
In December 2025, the Belgian Chamber of Representatives adopted legislation amending the Law of 15 December 1980 on access to the territory, residence, settlement, and removal of foreign nationals. As of 17 December 2025, adult children of elderly parents, including Ukrainians, applying for family reunification must demonstrate a net monthly income of at least €2,323.08 for a spouse or first dependent, with an additional increase of 10 % for each extra family member. The 10% refers to a fixed increment based on the base threshold, multiplied by the number of additional dependents.
This means that a family of four now requires an income of approximately €5,100 net per month, a level that many Belgian blue-collar workers and even mid-level professionals do not reach. Under the new income thresholds, even family members of highly skilled Ukrainian single-permit holders may fail to qualify, particularly particularly in households with three or more dependents.
Applications that do not meet this threshold are often refused at a preliminary stage, primarily on formal income grounds, which reduces administrative costs but risks separating Ukrainian families, with war in their country, for extended periods while sponsors attempt to secure higher-paid employment or pursue appeals. What was previously a standard and predictable mobility pathway is thus transformed into a selective mechanism that risks separating families based on income alone.
Administrative workarounds
According to the information available to Promote Ukraine, in response to these constraints listed above, regional authorities suggest that elderly parents register at a different address or even EU Member State to access social assistance. This practice would raise serious legal concerns.
Although Belgium is bound by EU law, it continues to apply its national family law rules to beneficiaries of temporary protection in the same way as to Belgian nationals. Under Belgian law, separate registration at different addresses does not remove family obligations. Articles 205, 207, and 353-14 of the Belgian Civil Code impose a mutual duty of maintenance between parents and children, which Belgium applied equally to its nationals and to Ukrainians lawfully residing in Belgium. As a result, Belgium treats beneficiaries of temporary protection as fully subject to national family maintenance rules, even though their legal status is derived from EU law.
The duty of maintenance, also known as the obligation alimentaire, is enshrined in Articles 205 and 205bis of the Belgian Civil Code. According to the case law of the Belgian Court of Cassation, a parent is considered to be in a state of need when they cannot independently cover basic necessities such as food, housing, heating, clothing, and medical expenses, assessed in light of their age, health, education, and social situation. Administrative practices that rely on family solidarity as a substitute for public responsibility therefore sit uneasily with both civil law principles and the social function of welfare systems.
…After temporary protection ends?
The families most affected by these policies are often those least visible in administrative statistics. They tend to have limited labor-market integration, lack independent housing, and occupy a legally precarious position. When temporary protection ends, many elderly parents will be required to switch to family reunification status, yet the new income thresholds make this transition increasingly inaccessible. The result is unlikely to be a wave of claims or litigation, as many families have resigned themselves to the current situation. Instead, the more probable outcome is a gradual process of invisibility, with individuals falling outside both migration law and social protection frameworks.
Judicial proceedings as a way out
One of the solutions for Ukrainian families would be taking the issue to court. If national courts were to rule in favour of affected families, such judgments could establish precedents allowing renewed access to social assistance and legal stability for some households. While this would not necessarily lead to large-scale claims, it could provide relief in individual cases and trigger political controversy. At the same time, the politically sensitive nature of migration and welfare issues may make courts hesitant to intervene, reinforcing a cycle in which legal rights exist in theory but remain difficult to enforce in practice.
Conclusion
An income that is currently considered sufficient for Ukrainian children to support their parents under temporary protection may soon be deemed legally insufficient to secure a residence permit and for the families to remain together. Belgium’s current approach reveals a misalignment between migration law, social law, and lived family realities. Income thresholds designed to regulate migration flows risk undermining family unity and long-term integration, particularly for Ukrainians transitioning out of temporary protection. The end of temporary protection risks replacing temporary vulnerability with permanent precarity.